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The Bourgeois and The islamisT, or, The 
oTher suBjecTs of PoliTics
alberto Toscano
abstract: There is much theoretical work already underway on the many facets of Badiou’s 
theory of political subjectivation. however, little attention has been directed hitherto to those 
figures of the subject which cannot be easily identifiable with a universalist or generic orienta-
tion. Beginning with Badiou’s struggles with the subjectivity of the bourgeois in the seminars 
that make up his Theorie du sujet (1982), this article tries to track his thinking of the ‘other’, non- or 
anti-universalist subjects of politics, and to think what effects their inclusion within a theory of 
the subject, and indeed a theory of political praxis, may have. Taking issue with some recent re-
marks of Badiou on the isomorphies between islamism and fascism in Logiques des mondes (2006), 
the article also seeks to develop Badiou’s notion of ‘reactive’ and ‘obscure’ subjects through a 
brief engagement with recent interpretations of political islam. 
Keywords: Badiou; subject; islamism; fascism; reaction; Bourgeois
suBjecTs of unTruTh
among the less fortunate by-products of the recent resurgence in emancipatory 
theories of political subjectivity is the tendency to depict the subject in an exclusively 
militant or, at the very least, ‘progressive’ light. Bracketing the contradictions of social 
class, or the pathologies of ideology, the political subject seems endowed, by fiat, with 
the steadfast virtues of universalism. While, confronted with a cancerous proliferation of 
noxious political ‘agents’ and ideas, such a stance may possess an attractive if minimalist 
rectitude, reserving the term ‘subject’ solely for the kind of collective egalitarian figure 
that could divert our baleful course might mean depriving ourselves of a potent instru-
ment to intervene in the present. if we relegate the reactionary, or at best ambiguous, 
figures that loom large on our political horizon to the rank of structural epiphenomena, 
fleeting phantoms or mindless tendencies, we run the risk of producing political theories 
that differ little from plain wishful thinking or self-satisfied sectarianism. even within the 
generally optimistic politico-philosophical paradigm which, by way of shorthand, we 
could call ‘the theory of the multitude’, some have begun to foreground the deep ambiva-
lence of contemporary forms of political subjectivity.1 But can there be any concessions to 
1. Paolo Virno, A Grammar of  the Multitude, new York, semiotext(e), 2004.
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such an ambiguity, to the presence of ‘untruthful’ subjects, in alain Badiou’s affirmative, 
and avowedly ‘Promethean’ theory of the subject? 
Badiou’s decades-long preoccupation with political subjectivity does indeed seem 
marked by an increasingly trenchant and ‘internalist’ treatment of the subject as both 
rare and aloof from the vicissitudes of social mediation. What’s more, Badiou makes 
‘subject’ inseparable from the novelty of an exception and the arduous trajectory of a 
truth which is always in the world, but in many ways not of it (or rather, a truth which, 
by forcefully including itself in the world makes sure that the world will never be the 
same). he does this by advocating a strenuously ‘post-cartesian’ thinking of the subject 
in which the latter is only figured as an effect, an aleatory trajectory or point of arrival, 
and not as a pre-existing source. after marx and freud, the subject is not a starting-
point, it must be ‘found’.2 all signs point to a stance which is wholly refractory to any 
analysis of the subject’s particularistic attachments, violent and violating impulses, re-
pressive desires, and so on. Badiou’s explicit decision not to treat the subject by way of 
a theory of ideology, and—despite his grounding allegiance to lacan—not to delve 
into its freudian unconscious, also militate for a purified, formal theory of the subject 
that would shun the subject’s unsavoury, pathological side. and yet, as i would like to 
examine in these pages, within the strictures of an asocial, non-ideological and uncom-
promisingly universalistic theory of the subject Badiou has proposed a number of ways 
to think and formalize the existence of other subjects, ones which are not the bearers but 
the enemies or obfuscators of truth. 
amBiValence of The Bourgeoisie
given Badiou’s roots in revolutionary theory one cannot but expect some traces in 
his work of the numerous contributions to the theory of anti- or semi-universalist sub-
jectivity within marxism—from marx’s own paean to bourgeois destruction in The Com-
munist Manifesto, to the wrestling with the rise of fascist politics in the writings of Trotsky 
and many others. it is evident, for instance, that a reckoning with the figure of reaction 
has been a constant in Badiou’s work. But perhaps one of the more interesting points of 
entry into Badiou’s theory of ‘untrue’ subjects concerns the status of the bourgeoisie. To 
begin with, Badiou intends to dislocate the apparently frontal confrontation, the class 
struggle, between proletariat and bourgeoisie. for the proletariat as a force (a crucial 
concept in Badiou’s dialectical writings of the 1970s) does not seem to be pitted against 
the bourgeoisie as another force. in some of the early seminars that make up Badiou’s 
Théorie du sujet, the bourgeoisie is depicted as a mere agent of a system of places, of a 
Whole which the proletariat seeks to destroy by what Badiou calls a ‘torsion’, whereby 
an included but suppressed element comes to limit, then destroy, the totality of which 
it is a part: ‘To say proletariat and bourgeoisie is to remain with the hegelian artifice: 
something and something else. and why? Because the project of the proletariat, its in-
ternal being, is not to contradict the bourgeoisie, or to cut its legs off. its project is com-
2. alain Badiou, Théorie du sujet, Paris, seuil, 1982, p. 295 (henceforth Ts).
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munism, and nothing else. That is to say the abolition of any place wherein something 
like a proletariat could be situated’ (Ts 25 ). and, a fortiori, anything like a bourgeoisie. in 
this sense, whilst the confrontation with the bourgeoisie might be the ‘motor’ of history, 
the proletariat’s target is really the social Whole, i.e. ‘imperialist society’. 
moving further in the series of seminars that make up Badiou’s first major theoreti-
cal work, however, we encounter, in the midst of an analysis of the subjective weakness 
of may ’68, a portrait of the bourgeois as subject and force. indeed, Badiou stresses that 
revolutionaries have always made the mistake of thinking themselves to be ‘the only 
subject, and represent the antagonistic class to themselves as an objective mechanism 
of oppression led by a handful of profiteers.’ on the contrary, one of the lessons of the 
chinese cultural revolution, according to Badiou, is that the bourgeoisie too engages 
in politics, and not simply by means of exploitation or coercion. asking himself where this 
politics takes place, Badiou answers, with rare gramscian overtones: ‘exactly as with 
the proletariat: in the people, working class included, and i would even say, since we’re 
dealing with the new bureaucratic state bourgeoisie, working class especially included’. 
The reason for thus foregrounding the ‘subjective force of the adversary’ is to counter 
the feeble-minded and objectivist ‘anti-repressive logorrhoea’, for which the only enemy 
would be a moloch-like state. contrary to this anarchistic ‘leftism’, Badiou proposes 
the following assertion: ‘of course, they are a handful, the bourgeois imperialists, but 
the subjective effect of their force lies in the divided people. There is not just the law 
of capital, or the cops. To miss this is not to see the unity of the space of placements 
[esplace], its consistency.’ The suggestion here is that the social space wherein the latent 
force of the proletariat is captured, placed and instrumentalized cannot be envisaged 
in a purely structural manner, as an impersonal given, but must instead be conceived 
in terms of that counter-revolutionary or reactionary subjectivity which carries its own 
project into the pre-subjective mass of the people. or, as Badiou summarizes in a he-
gelian pastiche: ‘We must conceive of imperialist society not only as substance, but also 
as subject’ (Ts 60). This, at least, is the position put forward in the seminar dated ‘15 
april 1975’, which appears to rectify the earlier understanding of the proletariat as the 
sole political and subjective force. 
in the seminar dated ‘14 february 1977’, Badiou approaches the question of the 
proletariat/bourgeoisie relation from a topological angle. if we follow an economistic 
tradition, which sunders marx’s Capital from the concrete (strategic) analysis of concrete 
(political) situations, bourgeoisie and proletariat appear topologically exterior to one 
another—the first defined in terms of its ownership of the means of production, the sec-
ond in terms of its separation (alienation) from them. The result of this purely external 
topology, is paradoxically to render the proletariat functionally interior or immanent 
to the bourgeoisie. reduced to alienated labour-power, the proletariat is nothing but a 
piece in the apparatus of exploitation, whose identity is entirely heteronomous, dictated 
by the laws of capital. Briefly, ‘capital is the place of the proletariat’. Badiou deduces 
from this the possibility of soviet state-capitalism, since it is perfectly possible, given this 
arrangement, to ‘suppress capitalists, all the while maintaining the law of capital’. To 
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depart from the compulsion to repeat and the allergy to novelty that characterize the 
economistic framework, Badiou enjoins us to think the ‘interiority of the bourgeoisie to 
the working class’ (Ts 147).
making reference to marx’s analysis of the series of uprisings (‘social hysterias’ in 
his lacanese) of the eighteen-thirties, forties and fifties, Badiou sees the emergence of 
a proletarian figure not as a functional cog in the machinery of capital, but as an inter-
nal ‘torsion’, an ‘exceptional disorder’ within the political trajectory of the democratic 
bourgeois movement. The proletarian subject is born out of its bourgeois impurity, its 
being indexed to a heteronomous capitalist order, and only emerges by the ‘expulsion, 
the purging … of the internal infection that, to begin with, constitutes it.’ The proletariat 
is thus depicted, through these somewhat unsettling medical metaphors, as perpetually 
in the process of healing from the malady of the bourgeoisie. insisting with the topo-
logical vocabulary, Badiou writes that ‘the politics of the proletariat is in a situation of 
internal exclusion with regard to bourgeois politics, that is, with regard to its object’. The 
proletariat is thus both within and against the bourgeoisie, constantly ‘purging’ its inti-
mate bourgeois determination. its ‘topology of destruction’ means that it is enduringly 
engaged in an effort to dislocate and ultimately destroy the site of its existence (without 
this destruction, it might just be a mask or ruse of the bourgeoisie, as Badiou deems to 
be the case for the ussr); but it can only do so, because of its originary impurity, in 
an immanent, dialectical combat with the bourgeoisie that internally excludes it. This 
topological vision transforms the standing of the bourgeoisie within Badiou’s theory of 
the subject yet again:
does the bourgeoisie make a subject (fait sujet)? i said so in this very place, in april 
1975. let us contradict ourselves, it is just a trick of par-être. The bourgeois has not 
made a subject for a long while, it makes a place (lieu). There is only one political 
subject, for a given historicization. This is a very important remark. To ignore it 
is to become confused by a vision of politics as a subjective duel, which it is not. 
There is one place and one subject. The dissymmetry is structural (Ts 148). 
class struggle, if the term still applies, is thus not between two separate forces, two sub-
jects indexed to different places within the apparatus of capital. it is an effect of the pro-
letariat (that ‘surviving body, born from the rot’) expelling itself from bourgeois politics, 
and thus gaining its existence through that very process of organized destruction. The 
theory of subjectivation as destruction thus appears to require the exclusivity of the term 
‘subject’, and the relegation of the bourgeoisie, and any subjects other than the prole-
tariat, to a phantasmagorical structural semblance. 
This oscillation in the appraisal of the bourgeoisie, and the dialectical arguments 
that motivate it, indicate the thorny problem posed to Badiou’s project by the existence 
of other, non-emancipatory subjects: if the bourgeoisie is not a subject, the theory of the 
proletariat risks a ‘leftist’ solution, a repressive hypothesis which singles out an imper-
sonal state or capital as its only enemy; if the bourgeoisie is a subject, antagonism seems 
. The untranslatable notion of ‘par-être’, a play on ‘paraître’ (to appear) is taken by Badiou from lacan’s 
seminars of the 1970s. 
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to absorb Badiou’s theory of torsion-destruction, and the historicity of politics appears 
doomed to ambivalence with the introduction of multiple forms of universality into the 
situation. as we will see further on, this antinomy of the other subject continues to haunt 
Badiou’s work.
jusTice and Terror, nihilisTs and renegades
abiding within the rich confines of the Théorie du sujet, we witness the return, in a 
very different guise, of the problem of the ‘other subject’ in Badiou’s attempt to for-
mulate an ethics. insisting with the metaphors of location and the topological arsenal 
that dominates the recasting of dialectics in the Théorie, Badiou proposes to rethink the 
question of ethics in terms of a ‘topics’ [topique]: ‘There is no major marxist text that is 
not driven by the question: Where is the proletariat? That is why politics is the unity of 
opposites of a topics (the current situation) and an ethics (our tasks)’ (Ts 297).4 But this 
topics also acquires a more precise meaning, referring to the affective figures that the 
subject (viewed as an unstable mix of destructive ‘subjectivation’, and restorative ‘sub-
jective processes’) moves across. This ethics is thus, first and foremost, immanent to the 
becoming of a subject—so how might it allow us to deepen our investigation of other, 
non-emancipatory subjects?
given the centrality of radical novelty to Badiou’s investigation, and what he has al-
ready indicated regarding the proletariat, born of a rotting bourgeoisie on the occasion 
of a social hysteria, the starting point for an ethics of subjectivity can only be disorder. 
What affects are borne by a subject that might try, by bringing itself into the world, to 
draw novelty out of this disorder? To begin with, a methodological proviso is required: 
like his theory of the subject, Badiou’s theory of affect is also post-cartesian, which is 
to say that it treats the subject as a formalization and an aleatory trajectory, meaning 
that ‘affect’ does not refer to an experience, a capacity, a spiritual or mental disposition. 
This ethics of affects, which principally concerns the subject’s stance vis-à-vis the law of 
the world which is being destroyed, circulates through four concepts: anxiety, superego, 
courage and justice. ‘These are categories of the subject-effect. What they allows us to 
know is a specific material region, at the basis [principe] of every destruction of what sus-
tains it.’ how these concepts are articulated to one another by the subject will determine 
its disposition with regard to the situation and its aptitude for the tasks of innovation.
Anxiety [angoisse] treats the given order as dead. it does not foresee the splitting and 
re-composition of the symbolic around a new law, but the simple ‘killing’ of the symbolic 
by the real. The consequence of this non-dialectical treatment of destruction as chaos 
and paralysis, abrogation of sense, is that ‘the law, always undivided, glimmers in the 
distance of what it no longer supports’ (Ts 07). The excess over the law has no other 
symbols than those of its death, and remains in a sense hysterical, ‘a question without 
an answer’.
4. The philosophical notion of a ‘Topics’, concerned with the topoi, the places or locations of discourse, de-
rives from aristotle’s eponymous treatise. 
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The intervention of the superego is thus depicted as a response to the morbid paralysis 
of anxiety: ‘as a figure of consistency, [superego] puts excess back in place by distribut-
ing it over all the places. The superego is the structural aspect of excess. Through it the 
algebrization of the topological is effected, as if, filled with subjectivating anxiety, the 
place recomposed itself upon itself in the terrorizing prescription of placement. … The 
superego is the subjective process of terror’ (Ts 08). The model here is provided by 
one of the crucial sources for Badiou’s treatment of the dark side of subjectivity, hegel’s 
diagnosis of the Terror. Where anxiety signalled the chaos of a world without law, the 
superego determines a fixing of excess (and of death); a pitiless control of the situation by 
the forcible introduction of a new law, which, as hegel shows, takes the shape of a purely 
negative and persecutory universality. But, foreshadowing the use of the same passages 
of hegel in the more recent lessons on the twentieth century, for Badiou the superego-
Terror ‘is a phenomenon of the subject, and not of the state … terror is a modality of 
politics and not the mechanical product of the modern state’ (Ts 09).5 What does it 
mean to think terror as internal to the subject? for Badiou it means that the criminal 
ravages of terror (e.g. the gulag) cannot be the object of an anti-statist moral critique, 
but must be rethought from within a (marxist) politics that comprehends the superego 
as an internal, dialectical and ‘restorative’ figure. if terror is subjective it is only by un-
derstanding the ethical trajectory of subjects—from the inside—that it may be parried 
or limited. external critique, which excises or ignores the subjective element, merely 
prepares the return or repetition of terror. 
The third ethical figure, courage, presents an important alternative to the subjectivity 
of terror qua antidote to the ravages of anxiety—where anxiety was a ‘question without 
an answer’, courage is presented as ‘an answer without a question’. as an affect, courage 
qualifies the kind of subject capable of facing disorder and the anxiety that issues from 
it, without demanding the immediate restoration of the law. What is more, courage 
subtends the capacity to act, to traverse the chaos of anxiety, without the coordinates 
provided by the law. When gnawed by anxiety—so goes Badiou’s recommendation—to 
act with courage is to do that very thing you think impossible, or before which you anx-
iously recoil. or, as his motto has it: ‘find your indecency of the moment’ (Ts 10). 
Possibly the most interesting ethical concept proposed in this ‘topics’ is that of justice, 
which is presented as basically the opposite of terror in its relationship to the law. While, 
inasmuch as its terroristic implementation is self-justifying, the superego absolutizes law, 
justice relativizes it, working by the criterion that the more real and the less law, the 
better. But for this very reason, justice is a deeply unsettling affect, generating ever 
further anxiety as it casts doubt on the viability of rules for dealing with disorder. insist-
ing with a dialectical approach, this is why the institutive character of justice can never 
be wholly sundered from the restorative procedure of the superego, and why justice 
calls forth two stances which deny its autonomy: dogmatism, which demands the untram-
5. see also alain Badiou, The Century, trans. and commentary by alberto Toscano, london, Polity Press, 
2007, especially chapter 5: ‘The passion for the real and the montage of semblance’, where hegel features 
as the principal philosophical reference for a reckoning with the molten core of the twentieth century. 
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melled supremacy of the superego over courage; and scepticism, in which the non-law of 
justice does not open up to the institution of new laws, but is merely the stand-in for the 
undecidability of law, which is to say, for anxiety. ‘justice is the flux [flou] of  places, the 
opposite, therefore, of the right place [la juste place]’ (Ts 12). 
What are the consequences of this quadripartite schema for a thinking of other sub-
jects? i would like to focus on two. The first concerns the ideologization of subjects, the 
second Badiou’s typology of ethical discourses. 
Besides serving as a psychoanalytic clue to the functioning of hegelian terror, the 
superego is also employed by Badiou to account for the immanent production of ideol-
ogy out of the travails of subjectivation. following a general methodological principle, 
which is that of following the vicissitudes of the subject without immediately imposing 
upon it the marks of structure, Badiou here proposes to see ideology as a product of 
something like an ethical failing within the subject itself. While ‘true’ subjectivation 
involves the real piercing into the symbolic, and the hazardous effort to recompose a 
new order after the destruction of the system of places, ideology is a question of the im-
aginary. holding to the dialectical demand that organizes his ethics of the subject—the 
idea that faithful subjectivity must topologically adhere to its other—Badiou sees subjec-
tivation and ideology as facets of the same process. he illustrates this with an example 
from an event, the german Peasants’ War of 1525, which he had already touched upon 
in his earlier collaborative work on ideology: ‘When Thomas müntzer sets the german 
countryside aflame with an egalitarian communist aim, he subjectivates courageously, 
on a background of death, and calls for justice. When he names his courage on the basis 
of the absolute conviction that christ wants the realization of this project, he imaginar-
ily articulates the rebellious bravura on the superego whose allegory is the “kingdom of 
god”’ (Ts 14).6 The same lesson can be drawn from the cultural revolution: it is the 
incapacity of the red guards to sustain their egalitarian programme, with courage and 
justice, that calls forth the imaginary and ideological guarantee, the ethical stop-gap 
provided by the superego-cult of mao. The anxiety produced by egalitarian disorder is 
thus assuaged, not just through the idolatry of a new, if under-defined law (mao-Tse-
Tung-thought), but, following hegel, through the persecution it gives rise to: the super-
ego’s manner of ‘saturating places’, which can only be occupied, without ambiguity, by 
revolutionaries or enemies. The imaginary dimension thus arises as a way of comforting 
the anxious subject, unable to sustain the uncertain discipline of courage and the unde-
cidable measure of justice. 
The terror exercized by the superego thus represents a weakness of the subject. But 
this does not exhaust the content of ethics. if ethics ‘makes discourse of what cannot wait 
or be delayed’, if it ‘makes do with what there is’, then its key problem, as Badiou explic-
itly draws from lacan, is that ‘the world only ever proposes the temptation to give up’, 
‘to inexist in the service of goods’ (Ts 25, 28, 4). What an ‘ethics of marxism’ would 
therefore need to confront are the various ways in which the temptation to give up on 
6. see also alain Badiou and françois Balmès, De l’idéologie, Paris, f. maspéro, 1976. 
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the labour of subjectivation, the labour of destruction, manifests itself. if ‘subjectivation’ 
names the destructive process whereby the subject subordinates place to excess, while 
‘subjective process’ defines the contrary, conservative tendency, then the character of 
defeatism or even reaction involves giving up on subjectivation for the sake of an older 
subjective process. The source for this remains internal to the subject itself, in the failure 
of ‘confidence’ [confiance] (‘the fundamental concept of the ethics of marxism’). if the 
ethical subject is identified with the party pure and simple, then the ethical nemesis is 
surely the renegade, the traitor to be liquidated (thereby returning us to superego-Ter-
ror). But if we rein back this ferocious form of placement, what light can ethics shed on 
the existence of other subjects? 
While Badiou had abandoned the idea of plural subjects when wrestling with the 
conundrum of the bourgeoisie, the issue seems to return once he declares ethics to be 
‘a naming of the subject as historically effectuated in the form of discourse’. for there 
is not just one, but four discourses of the subject for Badiou and thus, in a complex and 
problematic sense, if not four separate subjects, at least four tendencies within subjec-
tivation and subjective processes. These four discourses are the discourse of praise, that 
of resignation, that of discordance, and the ‘Promethean’ discourse. Their fundamental 
affective tonalities are belief, fatalism, nihilism and confidence. now, without delving 
into the detail of how these positions are derived from the prior distinction between 
superego, anxiety, courage and justice, it is important to note that the ethical subjects 
indexed to these discourses are intrinsically relational. in other words, they only exist by 
designating their others and the discourses of these others. 
The discourse of praise and the Promethean discourse are the two that in a sense 
lie beyond anxiety. But they are diametrically opposed in their relations to the Whole 
(or space of placements, esplace) and the force of novelty (or the out of place, horlieu). it 
is a matter of belief (or confidence in the space of placements) versus confidence (or 
belief in the out-of-place). While belief opens up the possibility of salvation, and the po-
tential eternity of the subject in a finally realized space of placements (without lack but 
determined by law), confidence, instead, works with fidelity to the innovative decision 
(courage), and a more porous recomposition of the real, less open to the law (justice). 
The subject of praise can here be recast in terms of something like the subject of the sys-
tem itself, the believer and defender of its righteousness, a truly conservative subject. But 
the Promethean subject of destruction and recomposition, the universalist (proletarian) 
subject, has two other counterparts, mired in different forms of anxiety. These are the 
resigned fatalist and the nihilist. The resigned fatalist is most likely the one who has suc-
cumbed to the service of goods, who, though not beyond the pale, is in a sense a passive 
nihilist and something like an after-subject. it is the real nihilist instead who, plunged 
into the discordance of an anxious world, but without the safety of knowing scepticism, 
is the subject whom the Promethean discourse wishes to capture and persuade. for 
the nihilist is indeed imbued with a certain form of courage (the passion for the act, for 
excess) but is incapable of justice, of the right measurement of the relationship between 
the real and the law. he lacks the confidence which alone allows the organization and 
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endurance of both courage and justice in a universal figure. 
Thus, despite his arguments to the contrary when addressing the possibility of a 
bourgeois subject, Badiou already recognizes, in the Théorie du sujet, the need to think 
different subjective configurations, not all of which can be regarded as the ethical bear-
ers of novelty and universality. Though his more recent work on ethics has been far 
more widely discussed than the earlier foray into an ethical ‘topics’, we can identify some 
manifest continuities, which bridge the theoretical caesura triggered by the introduc-
tion of the theory of the event and its metaontological, set-theoretical armature. in the 
first place, there is the idea that a subject is ethically defined by the manner in which 
it relates to other subjects within the space created by its confidence, or fidelity: ‘every 
fidelity to an authentic event names the adversaries of its perseverance’.7 This agonistic 
dimension of subjectivation clearly relates to the relational character of the theory of 
ethical discourses (e.g. there is no Promethean subject without ‘its’ nihilist). secondly, 
there is the idea that one can only rescind one’s incorporation into a subject by betrayal. 
This theory of betrayal is in some respects akin to the discourse of resignation in the 
Théorie du sujet. The (ex-)subject of betrayal in fact denies having been seized by a truth, 
drowning his previous courage in deep scepticism and bowing to the imperative accord-
ing to which we must avert the risks imposed by any truth procedure. Thirdly, there is 
the key tenet that the pathologies of subjectivity—more particularly the emergence of 
‘false’ subjects that trade in simulacra of truth (e.g. nazism) and the terror which exerts a 
full sovereignty of truth over all places—can only be understood from out of the possible 
impasses of a subject of truth.
The last is a persistent conviction underlying Badiou’s treatment of what, for lack of 
better terms, we could refer to as ‘non-universal’ subjects. in other words, it is the irrup-
tion of a subject of truth which serves as the aleatory condition of possibility for the for-
mation of other subjects. in the case of nazism, for instance: ‘such a simulacrum is only 
possible thanks to the success of political revolutions that were genuinely evental (and 
thus universally addressed)’. This is why it is only from the standpoint of fidelity to events 
of universal address—‘the truth-processes whose simulacra they manipulate’—that 
these other, non- or anti-universal subjects, become intelligible.8 or, in Badiou’s more 
classical terms, why evil can only be understood from the standpoint of the good. 
sTruggles oVer suBjecTiVe sPace
The foregoing discussion suggests that the problem of other subjects—in its ethico-
political, rather than epistemological sense—has been an abiding preoccupation and 
a thorny challenge for Badiou’s thinking ever since the mid-seventies. in this regard, 
the treatment of the theory of the subject in Being and Event, wholly concerned with the 
subject of truth, seems to hark back to one of Badiou’s theoretical tendencies, already 
encountered in the Théorie—the one which contends that, for a given situation (or space 
7. alain Badiou, Ethics, trans. Peter hallward, london, Verso, 2000, p. 75. (henceforth e)
8. Badiou, Ethics, p. 77
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of placements) and for a given historical sequence, there is only one subject. as we observed 
with regard to the concept of the bourgeoisie, there is something structural about this 
oscillation in the work of Badiou. are there one or many subjects? Prior to the recent 
publication of the Logiques des mondes, which we will deal with below, Peter hallward 
already indicated, in his indispensable and lucid summary of Badiou’s 1996-97 lectures 
on the axiomatic theory of the subject, that Badiou has found it necessary to introduce 
a modicum of mediation9 and plurality into his account of the subject. as hallward puts 
it, ‘Badiou realizes that an event can evoke a range of subjective responses. … he now 
sees each effect of truth as raising the possibility of a countereffect, no longer considered 
as simply external to the process of subjectivation, but as internal to subjective space 
itself ’.10 
as i have already suggested however, this realization should not be seen as a sudden 
innovation in Badiou’s thinking, but as the recovery of a problem intrinsic to his theory 
of the subject ever since his seminars of the 1970s. Besides the abiding preoccupation 
with the lessons of hegel’s phenomenology of terror, and the attempt to flesh out a theo-
ry of subjective betrayal, Badiou has demonstrated an abiding concern with the possible 
existence of subjects who veer from, react to or occlude the struggle for transformative 
universality. in this respect, the topique presented in his ethics of marxism, with its nihil-
ists, fatalists and believers, is a clear precursor of the theory of subjective space sketched 
out in his 1990s lectures and, with some amendments, introduced in his ‘meta-physics’ of 
the subject in the 2006 Logiques des mondes.11 in other words, i think it is useful, especially 
in order to survey the gamut of subjective possibilities investigated by Badiou’s thought 
over the years, to recognize that it is not just in the past few years that he has come to 
consider ‘the subjective realm precisely as a space—as something that no one figure can 
fully occupy and determine, as something that every subject must traverse’.12
given hallward’s exhaustive treatment of the earlier and unpublished sketch of the 
theory of subjective space, i will focus here solely on the shape that this notion of subjec-
tive space takes on in Book i of the Logiques des mondes. 
To begin with it is necessary briefly to outline the parameters of Badiou’s recent 
finessing of his formal theory of the subject. Pitted against hermeneutic, moral, and 
ideological models of subjectivity, it is worth reiterating that Badiou’s theory is not in-
terested in the experience of subjectivity, but simply in its form. nor is Badiou particularly 
concerned with the subject as a source of statements, a subject of enunciation capable 
of saying ‘i’ or ‘we’. rather, the subject is depicted as what exceeds the normal disposi-
tion and knowledge of ‘bodies and languages’—the exclusive focus upon which defines 
9. ‘To lend the event an implicative dimension is already to submit the process of its affirmation to a kind of 
logical mediation, as distinct from the immediacy of a pure nomination’. Peter hallward, Badiou: A Subject to 
Truth, minneapolis, university of minnesota Press, 200, p. 145. 
10. hallward, Badiou, pp. 144-5. 
11. among the differences between the two is that what appears as the ‘faithful subject’ in the Logiques des 
mondes was split into two figures, the hysteric and the master, in the lectures outlined by hallward. 
12. hallward, Badiou, p. 145. 
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Badiou’s current ideological nemesis, what he calls ‘democratic materialism’.1 While the 
theory of the subject as a whole certainly tackles the ‘subject-bodies’ (political parties, 
scientific communities, artistic configurations…) that support truth procedures, the for-
mal theory as such limits itself to the various formalizations of the effects of the ‘body’ of 
the subject. The theory propounded in Book i of the Logiques brackets the body (which 
is why Badiou dubs it a ‘meta-physics’), providing the general parameters for thinking 
how subjects exceed the situations whence they arise. The notion of subject therefore 
‘imposes the readability of a unified orientation upon a multiplicity of bodies’ (loW 54). 
This means that it also suspends a consideration of the specific historicity of a process of 
subjectivation, the manner in which the body of a subject is composed by incorporating 
certain elements of the situation and disqualifying others. The subject is thus viewed as 
an ‘active and identifiable form of the production of truths’. The emphasis, evidently, is 
on ‘form’. 
But does this entail that the only subjects deserving of our theoretical attention are 
subjects of truth, of the one truth that may affect and dislocate any given situation? The 
particular inflection of Badiou’s definition tells us otherwise: ‘saying “subject” or saying 
“subject with regard to truth” is redundant. for there is a subject only as the subject of a 
truth, at the service of this truth, of its denial, or of its occultation’ (loW 58). This ‘with 
regard to’ already indicates that there are indeed, as hallward suggests, different subjec-
tive positions or comportments, determined by a subject’s stance towards the irruption 
of the event and the truths that may follow from it. Badiou himself presents this theory 
as a self-criticism of sorts, arguing that his earlier work (he is thinking of the Théorie du 
sujet in particular) stipulated an all too firm and drastic opposition between the new and 
the old. in this new formal theory he wishes instead to confront the existence, amongst 
others, of what he calls ‘reactionary novelties’ (loW 62-7). To resist the new, to deny it, one 
still requires arguments and subjective forms. in other words, the theory of the subject 
needs to countenance the fact that reactionary forms of subjectivation exist—which for 
Badiou unsurprizingly take the shape of the anti-communist anti-totalitarianism which 
spurred the backlash of revisionist historians (françois furet) and the renegade nouveaux 
philosophes (andré glucksmann) to the emancipatory innovations arising in the wake of 
may ’68. 
now, as i suggested above, it is not entirely true that the Théorie du sujet foreclosed 
the possibility of reactionary novelties. The briefly-explored possibility of a bourgeois 
subject (not just in the french ‘new bourgeoisie’, but in the soviet bureaucratic caste) 
definitely depended on its ability to generate some kind of novelty, however abject or 
corrupt. similarly, the subjectivity of betrayal and resignation, or even that of active 
nihilism, as explored in Badiou’s early ‘ethics of marxism’, depend on the particular 
manner whereby they avoid or repress the courageous subjectivity and the just praxis 
of a revolutionary proletariat. They too are new by dint of how they respond (or better, 
1. alain Badiou, ‘democratic materialism and the materialist dialectic’, trans. alberto Toscano, Radical 
Philosophy, vol. 10, 2005, pp. 20-24. This is an excerpt from the preface to alain Badiou, Logiques des mondes, 
Paris, seuil, 2006, (henceforth loW). 
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react) to the disturbing irruption of that subjective figure. The fact that this formal theory 
of the subject comes after Badiou’s formulation of a theory of evental subjectivity (first 
sketched in the 1985 book Peut-on penser la politique?) does make a difference to the ac-
count of ‘other’, non- or anti-universal subjects. for one, as we already intimated in our 
discussion of the Ethics, the dependency of subjectivation on the event permits Badiou to 
propose a philosophical argument as to why ‘other’ subjects are radically dependent on 
a subject of truth. as he writes: ‘from a subjective point of view, it is not because there 
is reaction that there is revolution, it is because there is revolution that there is reaction’ 
(loW 71).14 This maoist thesis of the primacy of revolt, which Badiou had already for-
mulated as early as his 1975 Théorie de la contradiction, is now philosophically articulated in 
terms of the key ‘temporal’ category of Badiou’s theory of the subject, that of the present. 
in responding to the trace of a supernumerary, illegal event, and in constructing the body 
that can bring the implications of this event to bear on a given world, a faithful subject is 
involved in the production of a present. indeed, the only subjective temporality, which 
is to say the only historicity, envisaged in Badiou’s system derives from such an irruption 
of generic universality into the status quo. 
But if the present, as a kind of rigorous and continued sequence of novelties (a per-
manent revolution…) belongs to the subject of truth, how can ‘other subjects’ partake 
in it? Badiou’s contention is that they do so in a strictly derivative and parasitic (albeit 
by no means passive) manner. as he puts it, subjective ‘destinations proceed in a cer-
tain order (to wit: production—denial—occultation), for reasons that formalism makes 
altogether clear: the denial of the present supposes its production, and its occultation 
supposes a formula of denial’ (loW 71).
given the arduous and ongoing production of a truth, reactionary subjects seek to 
deny the event that called it into being, and to disaggregate the body which is supposed 
to carry the truth of that event. it is for this reason that reaction, according to Badiou, 
involves the production of another, ‘extinguished’ present. The thesis of reaction, at 
base, is that all of the ‘results’ of a truth procedure (e.g. political equality in the french 
revolution) could be attained without the terroristic penchant of the faithful subject, and 
without the affirmation of a radically novel event. as Badiou recognizes, this constitutes 
an active denial of truth, which demands the creation of reactionary statements and in-
deed of what we could call reactionary anti-bodies. Think, for instance, of the elaborate 
strategies of cultural organization with which the cia and its proxies sought to incor-
porate some of the innovations of aesthetic radicalism in order to deny their link with 
communist politics, invariably borrowing many formal traits and discursive dispositions 
from their nemeses.15 or consider the emergence, very evident nowadays among what 
some refer to as the ‘pro-war left’, of reactionary subjectivities. The resilience of such 
14. This means, incidentally, that Badiou reiterates his intolerance for those, generally ‘leftist’ positions 
which base their notion of revolt on the prior reality of oppression, and for whom the political subject par 
excellence is therefore the oppressed.
15. see frances stonor saunders, Who Paid the Piper? The CIA and the Cultural Cold War, london, granta, 
2000.
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subjectivities was convincingly mapped by georg simmel when he set forth his portrait 
of the ‘renegade’. due to the drastic violence of his conversion, the renegade, according 
to simmel, is in a sense a far more steadfast and loyal subject than a militant or partisan 
who, for whatever reason, might not have adhered to his camp with the same conscious 
resolve. as simmel writes: 
The special loyalty of the renegade seems to me to rest on the fact that the 
circumstances, under which he enters the new relationship, have a longer and 
more enduring effect than if he had naïvely grown into it, so to speak, without 
breaking a previous one. … it is as if he were repelled by the old relationship 
and pushed into the new one, over and over again. renegade loyalty is so strong 
because it includes what loyalty in general can dispense with, namely, the conscious 
continuance of the motives of the relationship.16
While the reactionary—and the renegade as one of its sub-species—suspends or 
attenuates the present produced by an event, denying its novelty but absorbing many 
of its traits, the second type of ‘unfaithful’ subject, what Badiou calls the obscure subject, 
entertains a far more severe relation to the new present that the faithful subject had 
given rise to. rather than denying its novelty, the obscure subject is focussed on actually 
negating the very existence of this new present. The obscure subject, in order to occult 
novelty, ‘systematically resorts to the invocation of a transcendent Body, full and pure, 
an ahistorical or anti-evental body (city, god, race…) whence it derives that the trace 
will be denied (here, the labour of the reactive subject is useful to the obscure subject) 
and, by way of consequence, the real body, the divided body, will also be suppressed’ 
(loW 68).17 The obscure ‘anti-body’ is thus very different than the reactive one. While 
the latter may be repressive, it is also aimed at persuading the faithful that ‘it’s just not 
worth it’, that they should resign themselves to a ‘lesser present’ and enjoy its diminished 
but secure rewards. The transcendent body conjured up by the obscure subject is in-
stead a kind of ‘atemporal fetish’, writes Badiou, under whose weight novelty must be 
thoroughly crushed and silenced.
Persisting with a conviction that dominates both the topiques of the Théorie du sujet 
and the theory of evil in the Ethics, Badiou suggests that the faithful subject, the subject 
that produces a new present by drawing the worldly consequences of an event, must 
entertain a differentiated relationship to the other figures who inhabit the new subjec-
tive space that his fidelity has opened up. compared to the treatment of the fatalist and 
the nihilist in the Théorie, in the Logiques Badiou strikes a more cautious note. i will take 
the liberty of quoting at length the passage where he compares the two figures of the 
reactionary and the obscurantist, in part because of the literary flair with which he gives 
flesh to these formal figures: 
it is crucial to gauge the gap between the reactive formalism and the obscure 
16. georg simmel, ‘faithfulness and gratitude’, in Kurt h. Wolff (ed.), The Sociology of  Georg Simmel, new 
York, The free Press, 1964, pp. 85, 86. 
17. Badiou links the theory of ‘obscure’ fascism to the ‘production of imaginary macroscopic entities’ and 
‘passive bodies of subjectivation’ in The Century, chapter 9. 
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formalism. as violent as it may be, reaction conserves the form of the faithful 
subject as its articulated unconscious. it does not propose to abolish the present, 
only to show that the faithful rupture (which it calls ‘violence’ or ‘terrorism’) is 
useless for engendering a moderate, that is to say extinguished, present (a present 
that it calls ‘modern’). moreover, this instance of the subject is itself borne by 
the debris of bodies: frightened and deserting slaves, renegades of revolutionary 
groups, avant-garde artists recycled into academicism, lovers asphyxiated by 
conjugal routine. Things are very different for the obscure subject. That is because 
it is the present that is directly its unconscious, its lethal disturbance, while it 
disarticulates within appearance the formal data of fidelity. The monstrous full 
Body to which it gives fictional shape is the atemporal filling of the abolished 
present. This means that what bears this body is directly linked to the past, even 
if the becoming of the obscure subject also immolates this past in the name of the 
sacrifice of the present: veterans of lost wars, failed artists, intellectuals perverted 
by rancour, dried up matrons, illiterate muscle-bound youths, shopkeepers ruined 
by capital, desperate unemployed workers, rancid couples, bachelor informants, 
academicians envious of the success of poets, atrabilious professors, xenophobes 
of all stripes, mobsters greedy for decorations, vicious priests, and cuckolded 
husbands. To this hodgepodge of ordinary existence the obscure subject offers 
the chance of a new destiny, under the incomprehensible, but salvific, sign of an 
absolute body, which demands only that one serve it by entertaining everywhere 
and at all times the hatred of any living thought, of any transparent language and 
of every uncertain becoming (loW 67-70).
While the reactive or reactionary subject incorporates the form of faithfulness, the 
obscure subject seems be defined by the twofold movement of laying waste to the imma-
nent production of the new and generating a transcendent, monolithic novelty, essen-
tially indistinguishable from the most archaic past. leaving aside the return of faithful-
ness in the fourth subjective figure, that of resurrection,18 what changes does this theory of 
subjective space bring to the earlier theorization of non-universalist subjects, and what 
prospects for formal analysis does it harbour? 
most importantly, the theory of subjective space appears designed to resolve the 
conundrum about other subjects which, in the earlier work, had been most acute in 
the figure of the bourgeoisie. in a sense, the new formal theory allows Badiou to af-
firm the relative autonomy of non- or anti-universalist subjects, whilst holding true, 
in his account of the sequence of subjects, to the primacy of revolt, in other words, to 
the primacy of the universalist subject. The new theory can thus be seen as a return, 
with the aid of a different formalism, of the ‘topical’ theory provided by the Théorie du 
sujet, though now instead of a discontinuous field of subjective affects we are presented 
with more clearly distinct subjects (faithful, reactive, obscure, resurrected). The relative 
exteriority of these figures to one another is also explained by the forsaking of the de-
18. for some interesting comments on the figure of resurrection, and its introduction into Badiou’s thought 
of a complex link between novelty and repetition, see slavoj Žižek, ‘Badiou: notes from an ongoing debate’, 
International Journal of  Žižek Studies, vol. 2, no. 1, 2007, available at: <http://ics.leeds.ac.uk/zizek/article.
cfm?id=21&issue=>.
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structive-dialectical schema which, in Théorie du sujet, had portrayed the proletariat as an 
immanent purification of bourgeois space, a subjective torsion whose aim was to destroy 
the space of placements constituted by imperialist capitalism. 
The oBscure suBjecT of currenT affairs
What purchase can such a formal theory have on the identification and examination 
of contemporary political subjects? in his philosophical considerations on the facts of 
september 11, 2001, Badiou opted for the notion of ‘nihilism’ to capture the specular re-
lationship between the ‘infinite justice’ of Bush’s god-bothering ‘capitalist-parliamentar-
ian’ regime and Bin laden’s pyrotechnic theological terror. The current situation would 
thus be framed by the ‘disjunctive synthesis of two nihilisms’.19 These nihilisms, unlike 
the youthful discordant nihilism courted by Badiou in the Théorie du sujet, are clearly 
not subjectively recoverable. What’s more, it is rather opaque what relation, if any, they 
might entertain with faithful political subjects. so it is once again to the recent Logiques 
des mondes that we turn for some clarification. 
one of the more striking features of this sequel to Being and Event for our aims is 
that, despite its formality, the meta-physics of the subject it deploys is marked by some 
extremely concrete examples. The most striking of these concerns Badiou’s treatment of 
‘islamism’ as the present-day incarnation of the obscure subject:
it is in vain that one tries to elucidate genealogically contemporary political 
islamism, in particular its ultra-reactionary variants, which rival the Westerners for 
the fruits of the petrol cartel through unprecedented criminal means. This political 
islamism is a new manipulation of religion—from which it does not derive by any 
natural (or ‘rational’) inheritance—with the purpose of occulting the post-socialist 
present and countering, by means of a full Tradition or law, the fragmentary 
attempts through which some try to reinvent emancipation. from this point of 
view, political islamism is absolutely contemporary, both to the faithful subjects 
that produce the present of political experimentation, and to the reactive subjects 
that busy themselves with denying that ruptures are necessary in order to invent a 
humanity worthy of the name, and who moreover flaunt the established order as 
the miraculous bearer of a continuous emancipation. Political islamism is nothing 
but one of the subjectivated names of today’s obscurantism (loW 67-8).
following the foundational thesis of the primacy of revolt (or primacy of the univer-
sal) Badiou is obliged to argue that if there is indeed an islamist subject, then this subject 
is derivative (by way of occultation) of a faithful subject. rather than a regurgitation 
of the past, islamism is the contemporary of a politics of emancipation (which is why 
it is useless to engage in ‘genealogical’ explanations). Possibly the most important, and 
disputable, aspect of this argument is that the purpose (whether conscious or otherwise) 
of contemporary islamism is ‘occulting the post-socialist present’. osama Bin laden’s 
19. alain Badiou, ‘Philosophy and the “war against terrorism”’, in Infinite Thought, ed. and trans. justin cle-
mens and oliver feltham, london, continuum, 2004, p. 14. 
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jihadist piety is precisely depicted as a kind of sinister fetishism: ‘the sole function of the 
god of conspiring islam is to occult, at the heart of peoples, the present of the rational 
politics of emancipation, by dislocating the unity of their statements and their militant 
bodies’ (loW 69). in what follows, i will briefly survey some of the debates about the 
nature of islamism’s relation to the politics of emancipation. for the moment, i want 
to indicate one of the most problematic aspects of Badiou’s account, which inserts it 
directly into some bitter and vociferous recent debates. This has to do with the equation 
between islamism and fascism. 
in his response to the attacks on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon, Badiou had 
in fact already characterized those acts as ‘conjuring up the fascist concept of action’ 
and thus as ‘formally fascistic’.20 moreover, the islamist use of religion was judged to be 
akin to that of ‘anti-capitalism’ by the populist fascism of the thirties, a mere demagogic 
vocabulary cloaking Bin laden’s thirst for oil and political supremacy. at bottom then, 
the 2001 attacks signal the presence, under the instrumental facade of ‘islam’ of ‘a type 
of fascistic nihilism’ typified by the ‘sacralization of death; the absolute indifference to 
the victims; the transformation of oneself and others into instruments’.21 in the Logiques, 
this verdict is corroborated by the inclusion of islamism under the rubric of obscure 
subjectivity, which is by definition ‘fascist’. Thus, according to Badiou’s definition: ‘The 
obscure subject engineers the destruction of the body: the appropriate word is fascism, 
in a broader sense than was given to this term in the thirties. one will speak of generic 
fascism to describe the destruction of the organized body through which there once 
transited the construction of the present (of the sequence)’ (loW 81).
Besides the all too hurried identification of Bin laden with islamism (when many 
commentators indeed see him as a phenomenon which is subsequent to, and incompat-
ible with, ‘political islam’ proper), one cannot but register the unexpected convergence 
of this formal theory with one of the theses that have recently permitted the conver-
gence between american neo-conservatives and left renegades, to wit, the existence of 
something like ‘islamic fascism’ or ‘islamofascism’ as the archenemy of today’s demo-
crats and progressives—a notion promoted by the likes of christopher hitchens, and 
very recently publicized, in some particularly incoherent speeches, by Bush himself. 
leaving aside the dubious invocation of crimes of association, what is interesting about 
this congruence lies in its preconditions. it is indeed the short-circuit between a notion 
of ‘generic fascism’ (or of ur-fascism)22 and the specific subjective history of anti-fascist 
20. Badiou, ‘Philosophy and the “war against terrorism”’, p. 14. 
21. Badiou, ‘Philosophy and the “war against terrorism”’, p. 160. 
22. for a recent treatment of (and intervention in) the scholarly debate on ‘generic fascism’, see robert 
griffin, ‘The Palingenetic core of generic fascist ideology’, in alessandro campi, ed., Che cos’è il fascismo?, 
rome, ideazione, 200, pp. 97-122, also available at: <http://ah.brookes.ac.uk/history/staff/griffin/core-
offascism.pdf>. see also his The Nature of  Fascism, london, routledge, 199. on ‘ur-fascism’ or ‘eternal 
fascism’, see umberto eco, ‘ur-fascism’, The New York Review of  Books, vol. 42, no. 11, 1995, pp. 12-15. it is 
worth noting that while those who advocate the concept of generic fascism tend to stress the modern and 
modernizing character of fascism, eco regards the ‘rejection of modernism’ as a key feature of fascism. Ba-
diou’s formal notion of ‘generic fascism’ seems far more ample than either griffin or eco’s proposals. 
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politics that has recently allowed members of the so-called left to sign up to the propa-
ganda wing of the ‘war on terror’ as if they were joining the international Brigades. 
it is important to note in this respect that the historical and sociological debate on 
fascism has long been dominated by polemics regarding its specificity and extension, 
both historical and geographical. so it is rather peculiar to see Badiou, so adamant 
about thinking the subjective singularity of particular political sequences (e.g. nazism 
in The Century) sign up to a thesis, that of ‘generic fascism’, which, in its formality, seems 
to forestall an inquiry into that very singularity. By way of contrast, we can note that 
one of the more exhaustive recent studies of fascism, starting from the methodological 
imperative to, as it were, ‘take the fascists at their word’ (to treat their political thought 
and practice as a subjective form) concludes with a subtle repudiation of the notion of 
‘islamic fascism’.2 
But, as we have already intimated, at the core of Badiou’s vision of the obscure sub-
ject as generically fascist there lies not a political taxonomy of the elements necessary 
for a fascist politics, but a formal evaluation of how this form of subjectivity relates to 
the subject which, by definition, opens the subjective space: the universalist subject of 
emancipation, the faithful subject. for Badiou’s theory of the obscure subject to find its 
exemplification in islamism it must be possible to argue that, in some sense or another, 
the relationship between islamist obscurantism and the politics of emancipation is one 
where the purpose of the former is absolutely to negate the latter, through the produc-
tion of a full subjective body and an archaic future. now, in the case of Bin laden, while 
it may be disputed whether the portrait of a cynical oil-fiend can withstand much scruti-
ny, it is indeed correct that, ideologically forged in the fight against the soviet satan, his 
relationship to communism bears all the hallmarks of the obscure subject. consider this 
declaration, from Bin laden’s first public statement, addressed to religious jurisprudents 
and spurred by the saudi royals’ support for the south Yemenis in the 1994 civil war: 
it is ludicrous to suggest that communists are muslims whose blood should be 
spared. since when were they muslims? Wasn’t it you who previously issued a 
2. for some useful references about this inevitably heated, and cliché-ridden debate, see the ‘Wikipedia’ 
entry at <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/islamic_fascism>. according to michael mann, in none of the dis-
parate, and often incompatible, instances of political islam do we find ‘the complete fascist package’. rather, 
‘the term “islamic fascism” is really just a particular instance of the word “fascist!”—a term of abuse for our 
enemies … the most powerful term of abuse in our world today’. as for islamism and hindu nationalism, he 
makes the following judgment: ‘They most resemble fascism in deploying the means of moral murder, but 
the transcendence, the state, the nation, and the new man they seek are not this-worldly’. see his Fascists, 
cambridge, cambridge university Press, 2005, p. 74. While the polemical character of the appellation is 
obvious, and the point about the categorical differences well taken, i think it can be argued that most of 
the aims of islamist politics, whether economic, legal or political, are remarkably ‘this-worldly’. it is also 
worth noting that Badiou himself, contradicting his use of it in Logiques des mondes, has even disputed the 
political value of the term ‘islamism’. as he declared in a 2004 interview, ‘words like “terrorism”, “islamism” 
and “crimes against humanity” are only destined to confuse situations and to create a kind of international 
political stupidity.’ alain Badiou, ‘las democracias están en guerra contra los pobres’ (democracies are 
at war against the poor), Revista Ñ, 2.10.2004. available at: <http://www.clarin.com/suplementos/cul-
tura/2004/10/2/u-854775.htm>.
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juridical decree calling them apostates and making it a duty to fight them in 
afghanistan, or is there a difference between Yemeni communists and afghan 
communists? have doctrinal concepts and the meaning of god’s unity become 
so confused? The regime is still sheltering some of these leaders of unbelief in a 
number of cities in the country, and yet we have heard no disapproval from you. 
The Prophet said, as related by muslim, ‘god cursed him who accommodates an 
innovator’.24
This ferocious hatred of innovation, of non-submissive secular equality, and of ‘this tor-
rential current of global unbelief ’,25 seems to single out Bin laden and his cohorts as 
sterling examples of Badiou’s figure of the obscure subject.  
But if we leave aside the not exactly representative figure of Bin laden, with his 
anarchoid propaganda of the deed and kitsch fantasies of the caliphate, the relation 
between islamism and emancipatory politics appears far more ambiguous. Taking the 
paradigmatic case of ‘political islam’, the post-revolutionary islamic republic of iran, 
we can see that the theocratic forces did not engage in a straightforward reaction to the 
mass revolts against the shah—in which they, alongside the various groups of the radi-
cal left, instead played a mobilizing role—or in a simple occultation. it is certainly true 
that—as Badiou himself already noted in the Théorie du sujet—the islamist superego in 
the figure of Khomeini played a role akin to that of the mao, and the archaic and tran-
scendent reference prepared the brutal occlusion of emancipatory trajectories. But the 
suppression of the left by theocratic forces worked, in the ideological arena, primarily 
by borrowing the left’s prescriptions and ‘islamicizing’ them, leaving the left the abject 
alternative of either abetting its own suppression or becoming traitor to the revolution. 
as Val moghadam noted, in an incisive appraisal of the strategic and discursive failures 
of the iranian left: 
The shared language of opposition had a further negative effect in that it 
obfuscated very real differences between the socio-political projects of the left 
and the religious right (‘national-popular government’ versus political islam/
theocratic rule). moreover, most of the left seemed unaware in the 1970s that the 
religious forces were weaving a radical—populist islamic discourse that would 
prove very compelling—a discourse which appropriated some concepts from the 
24. osama Bin laden, ‘The Betrayal of Palestine’ (december 29 1994), in Bruce lawrence, ed., Messages to 
the World: The Statements of  Osama Bin Laden, london, Verso, 2005, p. 8. Badiou’s portrait, according to which 
Bin laden’s ‘point of departure is a series of extraordinary complex manoeuvres in relation to the manna 
of oilfields in saudi arabia and that the character is, after all, a good american: someone for whom what 
matters is wealth and power, and for whom the means are of less concern’ (Badiou, ‘Philosophy and the 
“war on terrorism”’, pp. 149-50), seems to underestimate the sinister sincerity of his conviction, and indeed 
the fact that, were wealth and power the objective, Bin laden could have attained them with far greater 
ease without undertaking his peculiar brand of ‘obscure’ militancy. 
25. osama Bin laden, ‘under mullah omar’ (april 9 2001), Messages to the World, p. 98. it is worth noting 
that an ‘obscure’ notion of equality, the kind of equality by divine submission also favoured by Qutb, is part 
of Bin laden’s doctrinal arsenal. Thus, he writes in his declaration ‘To the americans’ (october 6 2002), 
that islam ‘is the religion of unity and agreement on the obedience to god, and total equality between all 
people, without regard to their colour, sex, or language’ (Messages to the World, p. 166). 
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left (exploitation, imperialism, world capitalism), made use of Third Worldist 
categories (dependency, the people) and populist terms (the toiling masses), and 
imbued certain religious concepts with new and radical meaning. for instance, 
mostazafin—meaning the wretched or dispossessed—now connoted and privileged 
the urban poor in much the same way that liberation theology refers to the poor. 
But in an original departure, the authors of the revolutionary islamic texts, and 
especially ayatollah Khomeini, declaimed that the mostazafin would rise against 
their oppressors and, led by the ulama or religious leaders, would establish the 
umma (community of believers) founded on tauhid (the profession of divine unity) 
and islamic justice.26 
even if we accept that the ‘purpose’ of iranian islamism lay in the occultation (and in-
deed, the persecution and often slaughter) of any body that carried a promise of imma-
nent universality—in what achcar calls ‘a permanent revolution in reverse’ and a ‘re-
actionary retrogression’27—it cannot be argued that it simply foreclosed the statements 
and organs of emancipatory politics. rather, in a far more insidious and powerful move, 
it incorporated them, transcendentalizing, for instance, the concept of anti-imperialism 
into a religious duty bound to the defence of the umma rather than the creation of a truly 
generic humanity. still remaining with the iranian case, we can see that islamism even 
produced a kind of revolutionary populism, in the figure of ali shari’ati, which, though 
posthumously manipulated by the clergy and its militias for their own rightist ends, is 
difficult to class simply as either reactive or obscure. 
in shari’ati we find an uneasy combination of the popular principle of rebellion, on 
the one hand, and an organicist vision of religious society, on the other. Via the likes of 
fanon and sartre, he incorporates an emancipatory drive into his political theology. for 
instance, he declares that ‘islam is the first school of social thought that recognizes the 
masses as the basis, the fundamental and conscious factor in determining history and 
society’28; that history is a struggle between the pole of cain (of power, coercion, and 
most recently, imperialism) and the pole of abel (a religiously oriented primitive com-
munism); that ‘it is the responsibility of every individual in every age to determine his 
stance in the constant struggle between the two wings we have described, and not to re-
main a spectator’.29 But the very principles of the emancipatory politics which provides 
the obvious matrix for shari’ati’s thought (primitive communism, the classless society, 
rebellion…) are hypostasized into spiritual notions which, to use the language that the 
Théorie du sujet applied to the religious politics of the german Peasants’ War, take equality 
into the imaginary domain of cosmopolitical unity, in the form of the opposition between 
26. Val moghadam, ‘socialism or anti-imperialism? The left and revolution in iran’, New Left Review, vol. 
166, 1987, p. 14. 
27. gilbert achcar, ‘eleven Theses on the resurgence of islamic fundamentalism’ (1981), in Eastern Caul-
dron: Islam, Afghanistan, Palestine and Iraq in a Marxist Mirror, london, Pluto Press, 2004, p. 57.
28. shari’ati, ‘approaches to the understanding of islam’, in On the Sociology of  Islam, p. 49.
29. shari’ati, ‘The Philosophy of history: cain and abel’, in On the Sociology of  Islam, p. 109.
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unity (tauhid) and discordance or contradiction (shirk),0 together with a radical reading 
of the notion of umma which nevertheless sees it, against the supposed shortcomings of 
socialism as ‘the divine destiny of man in the plan of creation’.1 
a related ‘translation’ of emancipatory themes can be found in the earlier and much 
more evidently revolutionary-conservative writings of sayd Qutb, whose sombre anti-
philosophy,2 organicist vision of society, and definition of ‘equality and freedom as com-
mon submission before god’ captured an authentic demand for justice and twisted it 
into an archaic and transcendent vision of a society finally free, not just of imperialism, 
but of the discordance and anxiety of modernity.
according to the group of theorists and activist retort, this dialectic of appro-
priation is also present in the most recent incarnations of ‘revolutionary islam’. This 
movement is characterized, in its diffuse and networked ‘body’ by a remarkable de-
gree of organizational, theological and technological ‘democratization’, the invention 
of a new, post-leninist (or post-anarchist4), articulation of vanguard and violence, and 
what they appositely refer to as ‘a new, and malignant, universalism’.5 While they too 
note the gestation of contemporary islamism in the writings Qutb, and some of the 
‘proto-fascist’ (but also ‘crypto-communist’) organizational models at the origins of the 
muslim Brotherhood, they regard its causes as originating in ‘the crisis of  secular nation-
alist development—abetted by a specific (and poisonous) political-economic conjuncture 
whose vectors were oil, primitive accumulation, and cold War geopolitics’.6 a similar 
judgment was put forward in the wake of the iranian revolution by one of the more 
astute marxist analysts of middle east politics, gilbert achcar. his theses on islamic 
fundamentalism, which provide a classical analysis of the petty-bourgeois roots of the 
islamist phenomenon, echo the analysis of fascism—such as when he writes that ‘the 
violence and rage of the petit bourgeois in distress are unparalleled’. indeed, achcar sees 
the bourgeoisie’s relationship to the phenomenon of islamism (particularly in egypt) as 
typical of its customary stance towards far right movements and fascism in general—in 
other words, to borrow Badiou’s terminology, reactionaries are always happy to use 
obscurantists against progressives, especially if the obscurantists can ‘outbid the left 
on the left’s two favourite issues: the national question and the social question; any 
gains made by islamic reaction on these two issues mean equivalent losses for the left’. 
0. shari’ati, ‘The World-View of Tauhid’, in On the Sociology of  Islam, p. 82. 
1. shari’ati, ‘The ideal society—the umma’, in On the Sociology of  Islam, p. 120. it is worth noting that this 
umma is distinguished by shari’ati in terms of its ‘purity of leadership’, which he explicitly juxtaposes to the 
‘fascist’ purity of the leader, obviously sensitive to the potential confusion. 
2. on Qutb’s relationship to philosophy and modernity, see roxanne l. euben, Enemies in the Mirror: Islamic 
Fundamentalism and the Limits of  Modern Rationalism, Princeton, Princeton university Press, 1999, p. 69. 
. reTorT, iain Boal, T.j. clark, joseph matthews, michael Watts, Afflicted Powers: Capital and Spectacle in 
a New Age of  War, london, Verso, 2005, p. 146. see also Enemies in the Mirror, pp. 62-. 
4. ‘for jihadist, read anarchist’, The Economist, 18 august 2005, available at: <http://www.economist.com/
displaystory.cfm?story_id=4292760>.
5. Boal, et. al., Afflicted Powers, p. 15. 
6. Boal, et. al., Afflicted Powers, p. 162. 
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islamic fundamentalism in this sense represents ‘an auxiliary for the reactionary bourgeoisie’.7 
But for achcar this emergence of a petty bourgeois reaction is only possible because of 
the feebleness of the revolutionary proletariat and the incapacity or unwillingness of the 
bourgeoisie to take on the aims of a national and democratic revolution.8 
 in this sense, the emergence of islamism as a political subject does not neces-
sarily represent an express reaction to emancipatory politics, but may rather constitute 
a capitalization on its absence, on the temporary incapacity of progressives to actually 
produce a present. unlike Badiou, whose view of political subjectivation seems to pre-
clude notions such as alliance or hegemony, achcar does consider the possibility, which 
was of course the reality in iran (his main point of reference in these reflections), that the 
proletarian subject might be obliged to struggle alongside islamism against a common 
enemy, imperialism, and for ‘national, democratic, and social issues’. and yet, this does 
not by any respects constitute a real alliance, since ‘the duty of revolutionary socialists is 
to fight intransigently against the spell [islamic fundamentalism] casts on the struggling 
masses’.9 The least that can be said then, is that even from this classical marxist posi-
tion, the problem of other subjects—of how to confront reactionaries and obscurantists 
whilst producing an emancipatory political present—appears as both urgent and ines-
capable. 
7. achcar, ‘eleven Theses on the resurgence of islamic fundamentalism’, p. 56. 
8. This position is corroborated by one of the most in-depth, revealing and sympathetic treatments of the 
subjective trajectories and resources of islamism, françois Burgat’s Face to Face with Political Islam, london, 
i.B. Tauris, 200. Burgat, while discounting the kind of socio-economic analysis favoured by achcar and 
other marxists, and refusing its characterization as primarily reactionary, violent or anti-democratic, places 
islamism firmly in the history of emancipation from imperialism and colonialism: ‘at first political, then 
economic, the distancing of the former colonizer through the rhetoric of oppositional islam becomes ideo-
logical, symbolic and more broadly cultural, on the terrain where the shock of colonization has been most 
traumatic. in addition to its own language, local culture and history endow the dynamic of independence 
with something that has been missing for a long time: the precious attributes of a sort of ideological “au-
tonomy” which perfects it, the right of those who propagate it to regain universality, without denouncing 
the structural elements of their “specificity” … it is essentially in the old dynamic of decolonization that 
islamism has taken root’ (p. 49). While Burgat’s sociological and anthropological focus on identity is deeply at 
odds with Badiou’s theory of the subject, it is worth remarking the interest in this interpretation of islamism 
as a tool for attaining a kind of universalizing autonomy. Without seconding Burgat’s sympathies, it is im-
portant to note that such a demand for autochthonous universality is a sign of the failure of classical eman-
cipatory discourses within the muslim world to attain a truly ‘generic’ status and not be perceived as alien 
or imperial implantations. moreover, Burgat’s work is almost alone in providing detailed accounts, using 
numerous interviews and autobiographical texts, of the life-paths of north african islamists—paths which, 
it should be noted, passed not only through arab nationalism, but through marxism too. for an attempt 
to delve into the subjectivity of extremist and terrorist variants of islamism, see juan cole’s intriguing study 
of the ‘spiritual’ documents left behind by the perpetrators of the attacks on the WTc and the Pentagon, 
‘al-Qaeda’s doomsday document and Psychological manipulation’ (200), available at: <http://www.
juancole.com/essays/qaeda.htm>. cole’s text provides a useful sketch of what a situated phenomenology 
of the obscure subject might look like. 
9. achcar, ‘eleven Theses on the resurgence of islamic fundamentalism’, p. 59. 
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conclusion
so how does Badiou’s theorization of ‘untrue’ subjects fare in the face of islamism? 
The few cases and figures we have looked at point to the difficulties in formalizing the 
majority of politics that may be identified as ‘islamist’ in terms of Badiou’s theory of sub-
jective space. even if we accept the thesis of the primacy of the universal—the idea that 
‘other’ subjects only arise in the wake of the emergence of a faithful subject and of the 
present it strives to produce—it is the specific relationship between the faithful subject 
and its two counterparts, reactive and obscure, that remains problematic. 
first of all, the obscure subject—the subject that submits its action and statements 
to a transcendent, full body—does not necessarily have the occultation of the faithful 
subject as its express purpose. one of the difficult lessons of the present conjuncture 
might be that, having vanquished the semblance or placeholder of communist poli-
tics, reactionaries and obscurantists are facing one another without necessarily passing 
through a direct opposition to faithful subjectivity. or rather—at least at the spectacu-
lar level—what we are faced with is the struggle between slogans, be it ‘freedom and 
democracy’, or mythical and theological corruptions of anti-imperialism, which, whilst 
bearing the traces of emancipatory subjectivities, do not refer to them directly. 
When its genesis was coeval with that of progressive subject, the obscure subject of 
islamism did indeed crush anything that could have given body to a generic emancipa-
tory subject, but it did not, contrary to what Badiou seems to intimate, erase all traces of 
the founding tenets of emancipatory politics. on the contrary, its tactic, largely effective 
against a left deluded by its own populism and strategic ineptitude, was to adopt and hy-
postasize the key principles of emancipation, making out as if their secular, communist 
version was merely a degenerate form of an archaic and eternal islamic politics, with its 
submissive organicist egalitarianism. in this sense, the obscure subject is more a thief of 
the present than simply its destroyer. 
When instead, as is mostly the case nowadays, islamism is not in direct contact 
with figures of emancipation, it seems to operate with the epigones of capitalist reac-
tion (cold Warriors like rumsfeld and Wolfowitz) as its counterparts, and entertains no 
univocal relationship to a politics of emancipation (aside from gloating at the defeat of 
its soviet simulacrum, peddling theological variants of anti-imperialism and egalitarian-
ism, or even, in today’s lebanon and egypt, making tactical alliances with socialist and 
communist groups). in a sense, this goes to corroborate Badiou’s sequence, which moves 
from the production of the present, to its denial, to its occultation. But, for reasons very 
much having to do with the concrete strategic history of these movements, the phantas-
magorical anti-bodies of islamism (e.g. the caliphate) are more to be understood as the 
mythical filling-in of a political void produced by reaction than as a direct occultation of 
a subjectivized universal body. This is not to say that islamism cannot be obscurantist, 
and indeed openly and virulently anti-communist (recall Bin laden’s exterminationist 
statement), but to note that our subjective space is currently dominated by struggles 
between non-universalist subjects far more than it is by their struggle against intelligible 
forms of ‘post-socialist’ subjectivity. 
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having said that, the presence of a gigantomachia, a bloody and disjunctive synthesis, 
between reactionaries and obscurantists does not as such occlude the emergence of 
‘true’ subjects. Which is why, in this grim interregnum, it is not a bad idea, not only to 
maintain open the possibility of universalist courage and justice, but to build on Badiou’s 
several attempts to develop a muscular theory of the subjects of contemporary untruths 
and half-truths.
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